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Abstract 
Uncertain facts and inexact rules can be represented and 
processed in standard Prolog through meta-interpretation. This 
requires the specification of appropriate parsers and belief 
calculi. We present a meta-interpreter that takes a rule-based 
belief calculus as an external variable. The certainty-factors 
calculus and a heuristic Bayesian belief-update model are then 
implemented as stand-alone Prolog predicates. These, in turn, 
are bound to the meta-interpreter environment through second- 
order programming. The resulting system is a powerful 
experimental tool which enables inquiry into the impact of 
various designs of belief calculi on the external validity of 
expert systems. The paper also demonstrates the (well-known) 
role of Prolog meta-interpreters in building expert system 
shells. 
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1. Introduction 
More than any other programming language, Prolog means different 
things to different people. In this paper, we focus on some 
aspects of Prolog which make it particularly useful for building 
systems for non-categorical rule-based inference. The basic 
notion of losic prosrams with uncertainties is due to a paper of 
this title by Shapiro (1983). The present paper elaborates on 
this concept in the context of expert systems and presents 
several extensions to the basic idea. The computational tools 
that resulted from this research turned to be very useful in 
experimentation with alternative techniques for rule-based 
inference under uncertainty. 
In a logic program with uncertainty, rules and facts are 
parameterized by some sort of a 'Idegree of belief." The program 
is designed to compute posterior beliefs in goals as a side- 
effect of standard theorem proving. Belief update can be 
performed either within the logic program itself (e.g. Clark & 
McCabe, 1982, Alvey et all 1986), or at higher, meta-level of 
interpretation (Shapiro, ibid). A Meta-interpreter is an 
interpreter of a language written in the same language. In 
Prolog, meta-interpreters have proven to be particularly useful 
in building expert system shells. The basic idea is that Prolog 
is already a very capable first-order inference-engine; turning 
this raw power into a full-featured shell is basically a matter 
of adding functionalities to the standard language. For the sake 
of modularity, this is best accomplished by creating specialized 
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meta-interpret=rs-and enhancing them incrementally (Sterling, 
1986). 
Prolog meta-interpreters were developed to add a number of 
essential capabilities found in most commercial expert system 
shells. For example, Hammond & Sergot (1984) extended the 
inference-engine with a ''query the userw facility which obtains 
missing information through interactive consultation. Sterling 
and Lalee (1986) developed techniques to explain the system's 
line of reasoning. A number of authors, e.g. Dincbas (1984) and 
Pereira (1982), have shown how the fixed control structure of 
Prolog can be short-cut and modified to suit various inferential 
needs. Baldwin and Monk (1986) developed a meta-interpreter for 
inexact reasoning based on the Dempster-Shafer model (Shafer, 
1976). 
The motivation for this paper came from the first author's 
interest with experimenting with a variety of belief update 
models in expert systems. It soon became clear that such 
experiments require a computational environment which (a) 
simulates a standard rule-based inference algorithm, and, (b) 
allows a great deal of design flexibility with respect to 
creating and modifying alternative belief calculi. This need was 
satisfied effectively by extending work of the second author on 
Prolog meta-interpreters. In the process of developing these 
tools, we became aware of a recent paper by Sterling (1986) 
describing the analogy between ~ i s p  Flavors and Prolog meta- 
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interpreters. 'sterling's paper provided an elegant theoretical 
framework within which our work can be viewed as a special case 
of flavor mixing. 
The paper begins with a synopsis of rule-based inference under 
uncertainty in the context of expert systems. Techniques for 
representing and parsing uncertain facts and inexact rules within 
Prolog are then described. Next, the building blocks of a belief 
update model are defined and implemented as logic programs. 
These individual modules, of which systems like MYCIN and 
PROSPECTOR are built, are then integrated into an overall meta- 
interpreter called SOLVE. The unique feature of SOLVE is that it 
takes a belief calculus as an external parameter. The paper 
proceeds to present Prolog predicates which implement the 
certainty-factors calculus and an ad-hoc Bayesian belief update 
model, and shows how these can be easily mixed with SOLVE'S 
theory. The paper concludes with comments on the suitability of 
this environment to experimentation on the validity of rule-based 
inference in non-deterministic domains. 
2. Rule-based inference under uncertainty 
The mathematical and cognitive underpinnings of rule-based 
(production) systems are well known, and the reader is referred 
to Davis and King (1984) and Newel1 (1973) for elaborate 
discussions. Due to its proximity to first-order predicate 
calculus, the rational basis of cateaorical rule-based inference 
is normally unchallenged. This validity, however, does not 
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extend naturally-to applications involving uncertain facts and 
heuristic inference rules. Under such conditions, a rule-based 
system may be viewed as a non-cateaorical classification program, 
designed to map a set of observed facts on a set of one or more 
explaining hypotheses (Cohen, 1985). This inexact matching 
algorithm is carried out by applying modus ponens repeatedly to a 
set of rules of the form <IF e THEN h Bel> (throughout the paper, 
e and h stand for a piece of evidence and an hypothesis, 
respectively). The postfix Be1 is a degree of belief, which, 
broadly speaking, reflects an expert's confidence in the logical 
entailment associated with the implication e->h. The problem, 
simply put, is this: given the prior belief in h and all the 
degrees of belief that parameterize rules and facts that 
ultimately imply h, how does one compute the posterior belief in 
h? In expert systems, this is typically accomplished by some 
sort of a belief lansuaqe. 
According to Shafer and Tversky (1985), the building-blocks of a 
belief language are syntax, calculus, and semantics. In the 
context of rule-based inference, svntax corresponds to a set of 
degrees of belief which parameterize uncertain facts, inexact 
rules, and competing hypotheses. The degrees of belief 
associated with rules are elicited from a domain expert as the 
knowledge-base is being constructed. Factual degrees of belief 
are obtained interactively through consultation. Posterior 
degrees of belief are computed through a set of operators 
collectively known as a belief calculus. The semantics of the 
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language can be viewed as a mapping from a real-life domain into 
the belief language. This mapping provides a cognitive 
interpretation and face-validity to both the syntax and calculus 
dimensions of the language. 
As the rule-based inference-engine processes rules which 
ultimately imply an hypothesis, a belief calculus is applied to 
update the posterior belief in this hypothesis. The process 
normally terminates when the belief in one or more hypotheses 
exceeds a certain pre-defined cutoff value. Ideally, we would 
like the system to be externally valid, namely, to assign the 
highest posterior belief to that hypothesis which best explains 
the observed fact-base. If we choose to abide to Bayesian 
rationality, this objective requires that the system's belief 
calculus be consistent with the axioms of subjective probability. 
However, it was shown by several authors (e.g. Heckerman, 1986) 
that the modular structure of the rule-based architecture is 
generally inconsistent with the wholistic nature of Bayesian 
inference. From a probabilistic standpoint, domain knowledge may 
be characterized by a joint distribution function F defined over 
the hypotheses/facts space (Pearl, 1986). Attempts to capture 
this knowledge through a compartmentalized rule-based 
architecture amount to making strong independence assumptions on 
F which are rarely met in practice. 
The artificial intelligence literature on numeric belief update 
algorithms consists of two major trends. Global methods, which 
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are due primarily-to Pearl (1986) and his colleagues at UCLA, 
view the knowledge-base as a space of propositional random 
variables, organized in a network. Pearl has shown that, for a 
certain class of distribution functions, there exists a method of 
computing posterior beliefs which is consistent with the axioms 
of subjective probability. Moreover, the method's run-time is 
polinomial in the number of nodes in the network. Similar 
algorithms were recently proposed by Shenoy and Shafer (1987) for 
the Dempster-Shafer model. Local or ple-based methods, which 
include MYCIN1s and PROSPECTORts belief update models, are only 
partially consistent with probability theory. Therefore, it is 
more prudent to describe a rule-based calculus as a "scoringM 
algorithm, a term coined originally by Cooper (1984). This 
algorithm accepts a set of inexact rules and a set of uncertain 
data, and goes on to "scorew a set of competing hypotheses. 
There exist conditions under which the resulting scores are 
probabilities, but this is not always the case. 
In view of the limited Bayesian rationality of rule-based 
inference, it is appropriate to question the merit of forwarding 
probabilistic research in this direction. There are several 
reasons, however, which make this a legitimate and potent area of 
inquiry. First, there exist techniques designed to transform 
certain wholistic evidential spaces into decomposed spaces in 
which rule-based belief calculi do have a Bayesian interpretation 
(Charniak, 1983, Schocken, 1987). Second, due to their 
relatively simple and ttlogicalfi structure, rule-based calculi 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
Working Paper IS-87-91 
seem to enjoy a'descriptive appeal; that is, they make sense to 
human experts. This is at least one reason for the fact that "at 
present, almost all commercially-available expert system shells 
are based on either EMYCIN or its fairly closed relative 
PROSPECTORw (Bramer, 1986, p. 3). Indeed, following the great 
popularity of such shells as EMYCIN, M.1, and AL/X, rule-based 
belief calculi became the de-facto method of handling uncertainty 
in applied expert systems. Consequently, the question of how far 
these relatively simple and appealing methods can be pushed is 
interesting, both on theoretical and on practical grounds. 
The present paper describes meta-enhancements to Prolog which 
enable it to (a) recognize and wunderstand'* the notion of 
uncertain facts and inexact rules, and, (b) compute the posterior 
belief in hypotheses with respect to a given belief calculus. 
Before delving into this discussion, we wish to present a simple 
example which highlights the essence of what follows. The 
example is taken from the familiar domain of rating propspective 
dates listed in a "little black book." Suppose a person, denoted 
hereafter "dater," wishes to determine whether or not another 
person is a good match for a blind-date, based on a limited set 
of available facts. For the sake of simplicity, let's assume 
that the dater's knowledge-base consists of the following two 
rules and two facts: 
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- - 
nice-voice(X) => good - looking(X) # 0.4. 
good-looking (X) or smart (X) 
=> date (X) # 0.8. 
nice-voice (leslie) # 1.0. 
smart (leslie) # 0.7. 
This knowledge-base has the following interpretation: (1) is a 
wishful (and inexact) conjecture that blind-daters typically make 
and then learn that they should have known better. (2) is an 
inexact rule of thumb which models the dater's social 
preferences. (3) is a certain fact about Leslie. S/he sounds 
good over the telephone. Fact (4) is an inexact estimate of 
Leslie's IQ. 
We see that, not unlike other domains of expertise, the dater's 
"knowledgew and perception of reality are heuristic and 
subjective, respectively. In the rule-based architecture of 
(1-4), this non-determinism is represented by the numbers 
following the # symbol. Note, however, that, barring these 
numbers, (1-4) may be readily translated to standard Prolog. To 
do this, one replaces the non-standard token => by Prolog's :- 
operator and reverses the direction of the two rules. These 
cosmetic transformations are of little theoretic interest. 
Indeed, had we chosen to truncate all the degrees of belief in 
(1-4) starting with the # symbol, we could have asked Prolog to 
prove the goal: 
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date (leslie) ? 
Prologls response to this query will be the laconic and rather 
unproductive result 'IYes." Under the given semantics, this 
means: "go ahead and date Leslie." We think that most daters 
would reject this black and white dichotomy in favor of a finer 
and more informative matcher. In particular, let's assume that 
(a) the # degrees of belief in (1-4) were reinstated, and, (b) a 
certainty-factors oriented meta-interpreter called SOLVE were 
available. Under these conditions, the original query may be 
recast as the following meta-query: 
solve (date (leslie) , Bel) ? 
To which Prolog will answer: 
Yes, Bel=O. 56 
Like standard Prolog, SOLVE attempts to prove the goal 
date(leslie), searching for facts and rules which imply this 
hypothesis categorically. In the process of constructing this 
proof, however, SOLVE also collects degrees of belief relevant to 
Leslie and fuses them into Bel, the posterior belief in the 
proposition date(1eslie). In a meta-interpreter environment, the 
Be1 variable is bound and updated on the fly, as a side-effect of 
the ordinary proof process. 
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The preceding diwussion made the implicit assumption that SOLVE 
has a built-in belief calculus. In other words, the belief 
calculus is assumed to be a fixed part of SOLVE'S theory. 
However, in view of Sterling's (1986) principles of mixing 
flavors, it is far more elegant and tasteful to define a stand- 
alone calculus, say c, and pass it on to the SOLVE meta- 
interpreter as a parameter. In this form, the query 
solve(h,Bel,c) consists of a request to confirm an hypothesis, h, 
and compute its posterior belief, Bel, modulo the belief 
calculus, c. 
For example, let cl and c2 be two complex Prolog predicates which 
implement the certainty-factors (CF) and the Bayesian calculus, 
respectively, and consider the following set of queries: 
solve (date (leslie) , cl ,xl) ? 
solve (date (pat) , cl , y1) ? 
solve (date (leslie) , c2 4 2 )  ? 
solve (date (pat) , c2, y2) ? 
Suppose that the results of this experiment were xl > yl and 
x2 < y2. Let's assume further that the underlying knowledge-base 
as well as the corresponding CF and Bayesian degrees of belief 
were elicited from the same human expert. Under such 
circumstances, the results of the experiment clearly indicate 
that at least one of the belief languages under consideration 
failed to capture the human's preferences. This amounts to a 
powerful test of the empirical rationality of both languages: 
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excluding the change in the belief calculi and in the 
corresponding sets of degrees of belief, everything else is kept 
intact, including Leslie, Pat, the dater's preferences, and the 
inference-engine. 
. We wish to avoid here some pressing questions regarding the 
empirical validity of such experiments. These questions are at 
the heart of the broader issue of validating expert systems, a 
subject of a different paper. We do wish to emphasize, however, 
the instrumental role that meta-interpreters play in the context 
of such experiments. Specifically, the SOLVE meta-interpreter 
serves two purposes: first, it provides a clear and concise 
conceptualization of the experiment setup. Second, it serves as 
a working shell which can be instantiated with qtcompetingll belief 
calculi, leading to alternative and often conflicting system 
recommendations. These data sets, in turn, provide important 
insights into the compatibility of belief calculi and their 
sensitivity to a variety of design changes. Research in this 
direction is reported in Schocken (1987). 
The following section describes how rule-based knowledge is 
represented and parsed in the SOLVE environment. This discussion 
sets the stage for Section 4, where a detailed description of 
SOLVE'S inference-engine is given. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-87-91 
3. Knowledse Representation 
So far we have deliberately ignored the meaning of the numbers 
following the # symbol. The interpretation and treatment of 
these degrees of belief depend on our choice of a belief 
language. In EMYCIN and M.1, degrees of belief are elicited and 
represented as diasnostic certainty-factors, bearing evidence 
from facts to hypotheses. In Bayesian systems (e.g. PROSPECTOR), 
degrees of belief are causal, representing the likelihood of 
observing certain facts given alternative prospective hypotheses. 
Causal and diagnostic methods of knowledge engineering are quite 
different, both on cognitive and on mathematical grounds. 
Readers who are interested in this important ndualityw are 
referred to Einhorn and Hogarth (1987) and to Shachter and 
Heckerman (1986). 
This section deals with two syntactically related topics. First, 
we present a simple "user-orientedQ' language for representing 
inexact rules and uncertain facts. Using this language and a 
standard word-processor, one can create and update a knowledge- 
base outside the Prolog environment. Let's assume that this 
knowledge-base is stored in a flat file called KBASE. Next, we 
wish to be able to merge KBASE with SOLVE'S theory through 
Prolog's system predicate CONSULT. This, however, requires a 
certain degree of parsing and pre-processing, which are also 
covered in this section. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-87-91 
Going back to the-dating example, consider the following subset 
of an hypothetical, CF-oriented, KBASE file: 
/* rule-base */ 
rich(X) => date (X) # 0.2. 
age(X,Age) and Age>l8 and Age<35 => date(X) # 0.3. 
salary(X,Salary) and Salary>75000 or 
parent(X,Parent) and salary(Parent,SalaryP) and SalaryP>150000 
=>  rich(^) # 0.9. 
/*  fact base */ 
age(nicky, 28) . 
parent (nicky , bob) . 
salary (bob, 160000) , 
salary(nicky,20000) # 0.8. 
good-looking (pat) # 0.95. 
salary (pat, 0) . 
age (pat, 24) . 
potential-date(nicky). 
potential-date(pat). 
How can we merge this set of non-standard clauses with a standard 
Prolog database? ideally, we would like to simply prove the goal 
consult(kbase). This, however, won't work, since the KBASE 
syntax in incompatible with Prolog. This difference can be 
resolved as follows: first, enhance Prolog's syntax by adding the 
tokens "=>,  or, "and, and 'I#" to the language. Next, 
specify their semantics. The first 
through the following predicate: 
define-syntax :- op(255,xfy,=>), 
op(254,xfx,#), 
op(254,xfx,or), 
op(253,xfxtand) . 
modification is accomplished 
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Each application-of the system predicate op(P,A,T) defines the 
token T as a new, non-standard Prolog operator. The precedence 
and associativity properties of T are given by P and A, 
respectively. The actual values of these arguments vary from one 
Prolog implementation to another and are of little interest. 
Having added a bunch of non-standard clauses to Prolog, we now 
have to describe their intended meaning. The general strategy 
taken here is to convert all rules and facts into a '*generic 
clausal formw consistent with Prolog's syntax. In particular, we 
wish to (a) convert inexact rules of the form ce => h # Bel> into 
the generic clause (h,e,Bel), and, (b) convert uncertain facts of 
the form <e # Bel> into the generic clause (e,true,Bel). The 
generic clause is important because this is the only inferential 
data-type that SOLVE understands. More about that, later. 
Since the direction of rules and the semantics of degrees of 
belief vary across belief languages, each language requires a 
specialized parser. The remainder of this section presents a 
certainty-factors parser and a Bayesian parser. The section 
concludes with some general remarks on other functions which may 
be incorporated in more sophisticated parsers. 
A Certainty-factors Parser: In the additive CF syntax, a 
diagnostic rule of the form <e => h Bel) means that e increases 
the belief in h by the magnitude Be1 which varies from -1 to 1. 
If e is irrelevant to h, Bel=O. The extreme case of e being 
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sufficiently condncing to confirm (disconfirm) h in certainty is 
modeled through Bel=l (Bela-1). There are basically two types of 
certainty-factors. The CF's associated with rules (e.g. 
rich(x) => date(x) # 0.4) are elicited from a domain expert when 
the systems's rule-base is being constructed. The CF's 
associated with uncertain facts (e.g. salary(nicky,20000) # 0.8) 
are supplied through consultation. 
A knowledge-base with certainty-factors is translated into 
generic clauses through the following parser: 
parse(H,E,Bel) :- (E => H # Bel). 
parse(E,true,Bel) :- (E # Bel) . 
parse(E,true,l) :- E. 
This code reads as follows: (5) matches the non-standard rule 
<E => H # Bel> with the clause (H,E,Bel). (6) matches the 
uncertain fact <E # Bel> with the clause (E,true,Bel). Finally, 
certain facts of the form E (with no attached degrees of belief) 
are defaulted by (7) to the clause (Eftrue, 1) which reads: E is 
true with certainty. The latter convention allows us to freely 
mix certain and uncertain facts in the same knowledge-base, and, 
at the same time, relieves us from the tedium of assigning a 1.0 
degree of belief to such certain facts as parent(nicky,bob). 
Instead, we let the system take care of this nuisance as a side- 
effect of parsing. 
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A Bavesian parser! In the Bayesian language, the flow of 
evidence is the reverse of the CF language, reflecting causal 
reasoning from hypotheses to evidence. Specifically, the rule 
<h -> e Bel> represents the assertion that (the cause) h is a 
potential explanation to (the effect) e. Given this 
interpretation, there are many ways to define the degree of 
belief, Bel, measuring the "strengthl1 of this causal implication. 
Indeed, the probabilistic meaning of causality has been the 
subject of an intense philosophical debate, and the reader is 
referred to Bunge (1979), Carnap (1954), and Churchman (1971) for 
insightful discussions of this issue. 
The Bayesian calculus implemented here is based on heuristic 
extensions of Bayes rule. This calculus requires that each rule 
of the form <h ==> e Bel> be accompanied by three probabilities: 
P (h) , P (e 1 h) , and P (e (h) . The probability of e, P(e) , need not 
be specified, because it is either (a) given, if e is a terminal 
fact, or, (b) calculated by the system through a lower-level rule 
of the form <e -> el Belt>. The most natural place to store the 
three probabilities associated with each rule is in the Be1 
parameter. Hence, we make the syntactical convention that the 
Bayesian degree of belief, Bel, is the three-place list 
[P(h),P(elh),P(elh)]. With that in mind, the Bayesian parser is 
defined as follows: 
parse(H,E,Bel) :- (H => E # Bel). 
parse (E, true, Bel) : - (E # Bel) 
parse(E,true, 10.9999, lJ]) :- E. 
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The meaning of'(8) and (9) is identical to their corresponding 
meaning in the CF parser, but note that the direction of the rule 
in the right-hand side is reversed. When the parser detects a 
certain fact through (lo), it defaults its prior probability to 
0.9999. The difference between this and the more plausible 1 is 
due to an uninteresting technical detail. 
Similar to the CF parser, the role of (8-10) is to translate 
rules and facts into the generic clause (H,E,Bel) which is 
recognizable by the SOLVE meta-interpreter. Note that no attempt 
is made here to unpack the compound degree of belief into its 
three individual components. This task is left where it belongs 
-- the belief calculus level. This again illustrates how a 
modular design can relieve the inference-engine from unnecessary 
technical clutter. 
Other Uses of Parsers: Thoughtful combinations of the OP and 
PARSE predicates can result with a great deal of design 
flexibility. In the present context, this flexibility allows the 
designer to modify the syntax of a belief language and its 
corresponding knowledge-bases without tinkering with the rest of 
the system. For example, suppose we wish to leave the CF 
calculus intact, and, at the same time, elicit degrees of belief 
that vary from -100 to 100 (this is normally done by most CF 
knowledge engineers). This leads to rules and facts of the form: 
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likes (XI sushi) --r -date (X) # -10. 
nationality ( X I  japan) -> likes (XI sushi) # 90. 
nationality (tomo, japan) . 
Following the standard CF requirement that degrees of belief be 
restricted to the interval [-1,1], we can pre-process the 
knowledge-base as follows: 
parse (H,E, Bel) : (E -> H # Bell) , 
Be1 is Be11/100. 
parse (E, true, Bel) : - (E # Bell) , 
Be1 is Be11/100. 
parse (El true, 1) : - E. 
One can easily envision other useful applications of PARSE beyond 
this trivial example. In PROSPECTOR, for example, there is a 
provision for representing belief in evidence through qualitative 
terms, e.g. woccasional,w Rrare,w etc. Those statements are then 
transformed into probabilities, e.g. 0.1 and 0.01 ,respectively 
(Duda et al, 1977). In a similar vein, Lichtenstein and Newman 
(1967) concluded empirically that verbal descriptions of 
uncertainty may be mapped on ranges of probabilities. These 
verbal-numeric mappings can be made explicit as a side-effect of 
parsing, as follows: 
parse (El true, Bel) : - (E # Bel-text) , 
translate(Be1-text,Bel). 
translate (woccasional*~, 0.1) . 
translate ("rarew, 0.01) . 
etc. 
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To sum up, the parser shields the inference-engine from the 
syntactical idiosyncrasies of the underlying belief language. 
This separation enables us to elicit and represent rules and 
facts in a variety of forms, and, at the same time, process them 
through a generalized inference-engine that operates on a 
collection of generic clauses of the form (H,E,Bel). 
4. The Inference Enaine 
In order to propagate degrees of belief in a network consisting 
of uncertain facts and inexact rules, a rule-based inference 
system must be capable of handling three generic types of 
reasoning: Boolean conditioning, sequential propagation, and 
parallel combination. This section describes each of these 
special cases of belief update schemes and provides their 
corresponding logic programming solutions. In the subsequent 
section, the three individual modules are integrated into the 
overall SOLVE meta-interpreter. 
Let h, el, and e2 be an hypothesis and two pieces of evidence 
with known prior belief Bel(h) and current beliefs Bel(e1) and 
Bel(e2), respectively. Our inference-engine must be capable of 
computing the posterior belief Bel(h/.) in light of any recursive 
combination of the following generic relationships: 
Boolean conditioning: <el or e2 -> h Bel) 
<el and e2 -> h Bel> 
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-. 
sequential propagation: <el -> e2 Bell>, <e2 -> h   el^> 
Parallel combination: <el -> h Bell>, <e2 -> h Be12> 
The exact specification of how to compute the posterior belief in 
h in any one of the above circumstances is precisely the 
definition of a rule-based belief calculus. Although the details 
of such specifications vary greatly across different calculi, the 
basic structure of the rule-based belief update model is quite 
invariant and isomorphic. This general structure is described in 
what follows, leaving the details for later sections. 
4.1. Boolean Conditioninq 
Consider the categorical disjunctive rule <el or e2 -> h> which 
reads: either one of the two pieces of evidence el or e2 (known 
in certainty) can alone establish the hypothesis h. How does one 
extend this rule to situations in which either el or e2 are 
uncertain? this question is complicated by the observation that 
the uncertainty associated with these facts is not necessarily a 
standard probability, but, rather, an abstract measure of human 
belief. Kahneman and Miller (1986) have argued that, under these 
circumstances, the most reasonable rule for Boolean combination 
is the one used in the theory of fuzzy sets (Zadeh, 1965). This 
rule, which was implemented both in MYCIN and in PROSPECTOR, sets 
the belief in a disjunction (conjunction) to the maximal 
(minimal) belief in its constituents: 
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Be1 (el or e2) = max (Be1 (el) , Be1 (e2) ) 
Be1 (el and e2) = min (Be1 (el) , Be1 (e2) ) 
Once the belief in a rule's premise is established trough Boolean 
conditioning, the posterior belief in the rule's conclusion can 
be computed using sequential propagation. 
4.2. Seauential Pro~aaation 
Rule-based belief calculi make the implicit assumption that the 
"actualw degree of belief in a rule has to change when the belief 
in the rule's premise changes. Specifically, let <e->h Bel(h,e)> 
be a rule specifying that "given e (with certainty), h is implied 
to a degree of belief Bel(h,e),w and let the current belief in e 
be Bel(e). In the process of doing rule-based inference, the 
premise e might be either (a) a terminal fact whose prior belief 
Bel(e) is specified by the user, or, (b) an intermediate "sub- 
hypothesisff whose current belief Bel(e1.) was already computed by 
the system. 
Whichever category e falls in, the posterior degree of belief in 
the rule, denoted Belf(h,e), is computed through a variant of the 
following "sequential propagation function:ff 
Be1 (h, e) = Fs (Be1 (e) , Be1 (h, e) ) 
The function Fs is monotonically increasing in both variables 
Bel(e) and Bel(h,e). Therefore, Fs is sometimes referred to in 
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the A1 literature-as an "attenuation function," designed to 
translate the uncertainty associated with a rule's premise into 
the uncertainty associated with the rule itself. 
4.3. Parallel Combination 
Let h be an hypothesis with current degree of belief Bel(h) and 
let eel -> h Bel(h,el) > and ee2 -> h Bel(h,e2) > be two rules that 
bear evidence on h independently. The combined, posterior belief 
in h in light of {elre2) is given by the following binary 
"parallel combination functi~n:~~ 
Be1 (hl el,e2) = Fp (Be1 (h) , Be1 (h,el) ,Be1 (h,e2) ) 
(it is implicitly assumed that Bel(h,el) and Bel(h,e2) were 
already attenuated by Fs). In order to free the inference 
process from order and clustering effects, the function Fp is 
normally required to be commutative and associative. If these 
requirements are satisfied, the binary Fp function can be 
extended recursively to an n-ary parallel combination function. 
The details of this extension are straightforward. 
The description of a belief calculus given in this section was 
deliberately given in skeletal terms; this abstract level of 
specification is all that is required by the SOLVE meta- 
interpreter. The actual specification of the functions 
eFs,Fp,Fand,For> is made at another, meta-level of 
interpretation. This technique, however, requires a method for 
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binding a specific belief calculus <fs,fp,fand,for> to the SOLVE 
environment. This technique is described in the next section. 
4.4. A Note on "Function Variablesw in Proloq 
In the preceding paragraphs, the sequential and parallel 
combination functions were specified using the conventional 
algebraic notation Y=f(X). In Prolog, this notation has no 
meaning. Instead, the logic programming equivalent of the 
computation Y=f(X) is normally the predicate f(X,Y). This goal 
is made to succeeds always, unifying the variable Y to the value 
f(X). For example, the successor function s(X)=X+l is 
implemented through the predicate s(X,Y) :- Y is X+1. When we 
ask Prolog to prove the goal s(3,Y), Prolog succeeds and binds Y 
to 4 as a side-effect. 
Now, things become slightly more complicated if we wish to treat 
the functor f itself as a variable. This is precisely what is 
required in the SOLVE meta-interpreter, which uses a belief 
calculus without knowing its exact specification, From a design 
standpoint, the ideal solution is to pass the four predicates 
cfs,fp,fand,for> as parameters to the SOLVE predicate, creating a 
goal of the form solve(h,Bel,fs,fp,fand,for), In this context, 
the predicates cfs,fp,fand,for> are meant to instantiate the 
variables <Fs,Fp,Fand,For> in SOLVE. However, this type of 
quantification is beyond the scope of first-order predicate 
calculus, and, consequently, is illegal in Prolog. This 
limitation can be overcome by second-order programming, taking 
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advantage of Profog's gfuniv'* =.. operator. Among other things, 
this operator may be used to bind variables to functions. For 
example, consider the following APPLY predicate, defined in 
(Sterling and Shapiro, 1986): 
applyl(F,Xs) :- Goal=..[FIXs], Goal. 
The goal applyl(f,Xs) causes Prolog to apply the function f to 
the argument list Xs. For example, the goal applyl(s,[3,Y]) will 
succeed, resulting with Y=4. 
In this paper we define a more powerful version of APPLY, as 
follows: 
apply(Predicate,Args) :- Predicate=..PredList, 
append(PredList,Args,GoalList), 
goal=..GoalList, 
call (Goal) . 
~efined that way, the first argument of apply, Predicate, can be 
either an atomic symbol naming a predicate, or, alternatively, a 
term representing a predicate with some of its arguments 
supplied. For example, apply(sf[3,Y]) will yield Y-4, and so 
will As yet another example of the utility of 
APPLY, consider the following numeric computation of the square- 
root function, using Newton's approximation formula: 
sqrt (X,Y) :- apply(newton(0.01) , [XJ]) . 
newton(Epsilon,X,Y) :- iterate(Epsilon,X,Y,l). 
iterate(Epsilon,X,Y,Y) :- Diff is X-Y*Y,abs(Diff,Z),Z=cEpsilon,!. 
iterate(Epsilon,X,Y,Z) :- New2 is (X/Z+Z)/2, 
iterate(Epsilon,X,Y,Newz) 
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Defined that way, the parameter of the NEWTON predicate, 
currently set to 0.01, specifies the precision level of the SQRT 
function. That is, Y is guranteed to be within a 0.01 
neighborhood of the true value of In this example, 
sqrt(4,Y) will yield Y-2.0006. 
To sum up, we see that the term representing the predicate in our 
definition of APPLY is the equivalent of a closure in a Lisp- 
based functional language. 
The programming techniques discussed in this section have general 
implications to software engineering beyond the context of this 
paper. We have chosen to present this material here because 
second-order programming is used extensively in the SOLVE 
architecture. In particular, the APPLY predicate plays a central 
role in mixing flavors, i.e. adding functionalities to the 
wvannilalt meta-interpreter. This analogy becomes clearer in the 
next section. 
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4.5. Puttins it All tosether 
The theory of SOLVE consists of a recursive union of all the 
modules described thus far, namely parsing, Boolean conditioning, 
sequential propagation, and parallel combination. The complete 
definition of SOLVE is as follows: 
solve((H1 and H2),Bel,Fs,Fp,Fand,For) :- 
solve(H1,Bell,Fs,Fp,Fand,For), 
(13) 
solve(H2,Bel2,Fs,Fp,Fand,For), 
apply (Fand (Bell, Bel2) , [Bel J ) . 
solve (H, Be1 , Fs, Fp, Fand, For) : - 
parse (Hr-Belp) , ! , 
bagof(Belx, 
(14 1 
(parse (H, E, Bel-rule) , 
(15) 
solve(E,Bel e,Fs,Fp,Fand,For) , 
(16 ) 
(17) 
apply (Fs, [BG~-e,  el-rule, ~ e l x )   , (18) 
Bels) , 
apply(Fp,[Belp,Bels,Bel]). 
(19) 
(2 0 
solve(E,l,Fs,Fp,Fand,For) :- E,!. 
The base-fact (11) of SOLVE, which is ground, assigns a belief of 
1 to the constant hypothesis @*true." The subsequent handling of 
Boolean conditioning in (12-13) is self-explanatory. In (14), 
PARSE is used to check if the hypothesis H is present in the 
knowledge-base, and, if so, to bind Belp to its prior degree of 
belief. The BAGOF predicate accomplishes a few things. First, 
it looks (through parsing) for all the rules <E => H Be1 rule> 
- 
whose conclusion is H (16). For each such rule, SOLVE is applied 
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recursively to Compute the posterior belief in the premise, E, 
yielding Bel-e (17). This ncurrent belief,I1 in turn, is used by 
Fp to attenuate the original degree of belief, Be1 - rule, into 
Belx (18). Attenuated degrees of belief are strung together (via 
BAGOF) into the list Bels (19). 
The Ifpunch linew of SOLVE is (20). When we get to this point, 
the list Bels consists of all the attenuated degrees of belief 
associated with all the rules whose conclusion is H. Since this 
list is constructed recursively, Bels incapsulates all the 
evidence that SOLVE drew from all the reasoning chains whose 
ultimate conclusion is H. At that point, the parallel 
combination function Fp is applied to fuse this information with 
the prior belief Belp, yielding the ultimate outcome of SOLVE, 
i.e, the posterior belief, Bel. 
To sum up, SOLVE(H,Bel,Fs,Fp,Fand,For) implements an exhaustive 
depth-first search, pruning all the rules and facts which bear 
evidence on H, either directly or indirectly. As a side-effect 
of this process, the program computes the posterior belief in H 
modulo the belief calculus <Fs,Fp,Fand,For>. When SOLVE branches 
horizontally, Fp is used to combine the degrees of belief 
originating from rules whose direct conclusion is H. When SOLVE 
backtracks from a vertical recursive call, Fs is used to 
synthesize the belief committed to H from lower-levels of 
reasoning. If a Boolean **forkt* is encountered, either Fand or 
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For are applied to compute the posterior belief coming out of the 
fork. 
The reader has probably noticed that the predicates 
<Fs,Fp,Fand,For> are still unspecified. This was done in 
purpose, in order to highlight the modularity and top-down design 
of SOLVE. Indeed, one motivation for writing this paper was to 
demonstrate the ease by which a belief calculus can be added to 
or modified within the SOLVE environment. This is accomplished 
in a completely orthogonal manner, i.e. without tinkering with 
any other part of the meta-interpreter. To illustrate this 
point, we now proceed to define two examples of well-known rule- 
based belief calculi. In the modular SOLVE environment, this 
amounts to no more than specifying the theory of the predicates 
cFs,Fp,Fand,For>. 
5. Rule-Based Belief Calculi 
This section gives Prolog implementations of the CF calculus and 
an ad-hoc Bayesian calculus. These models are presented 
verbatim, and no attempt is made here to either defend their 
cognitive appeal or argue for or against their normative 
justification. The literature is by now rife with probabilistic 
analyses and commentary of this sort, e.g. Heckerman (1986), 
Grosof (1986), and Schocken and Kleindorfer (1987). 
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5.1. The certainty-factors Calculus 
Following its great popularity in applied expert systems, the 
certainty-factors calculus has evolved into several forms, all of 
which might be easily incorporated into the SOLVE architecture. 
The calculus discussed here adheres to the original model, 
described in detail by Buchanan and Shortliffe (1984). 
Seuuential combination: The CF associated with the diagnostic 
rule <e => h CF(hle)> is elicited from a domain expert under the 
assumption that the premise e is known with certainty. When the 
belief in e is less than certainty, the CF calculus attenuates 
the rule's degree of belief through the following sequential 
propagation function: 
CF(h1 e) * CF(e) If CF(e) > 0 
CFg(hle) = 
otherwise 
This function is implemented in Prolog as follows: 
cf - s(Be1-e,Bel-rule,Bel) :- max(0,Bel~e,Bel~max), 
Be1 is Bel-rule * Belmax, 
Parallel combination: When two rules <el->h CF(hjel)> and 
<e2 ->h CF(hleZ)> bear evidence on h independently, their compound 
increased belief in h in light of {elre2) is computed through the 
binary CF parallel combination function: 
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- f if both CFgs are positive: 
if both CF's are negative: (21) 
CF(hlelte2) = -(ICF(hlel) l+lCF(hled I*(l-ICF(hlel) I) 
I if CF(hlel)>O and CF(hle2)<0 
The Prolog implementation of this function is as follows: 
cf3-2 (XJ, 2 )  : - ( (X=<O , Y>=0) ; (X>=O , Y=<O) ) , 
abs (X,A) , abs (Y, B) , min(A, B,C) , 
Z is (X+Y)/(l-C),!. 
An inspection of (21) reveals that c f ~ 2  is both commutative and 
associative. Hence, (21) might be applied recursively to compute 
the compound evidential impact of any finite set of independent 
rules. The resulting n-ary expansion of cfg-2 is as follows: 
cfJ(-,Elto)* 
cfg(-, [XI Xs] ,Bel) : - cfg(-,Xs, Bel-Xs) , 
cfg-2 (X, Bel-Xs, Bel) . 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-87-91 
The explicit omission of the first variable in (22) underscores 
the fact that the CF language ignores prior beliefs. This can be 
seen clearly in the definition of the base-fact of c f g ,  which 
models the llstate of insufficient reasonM (Savage, 1954). This 
case, which is characterized by an empty set of diagnostic facts, 
causes c f j  to assign a posterior belief of 0 to the hypothesis 
in question. This is consistent with the additive CF rationale, 
in which the absence of any relevant evidence on h causes the 
belief in h to neither increase nor decrease. In a Bayesian 
language, one would normally model this case by setting the 
posterior belief in the hypothesis to its prior belief. 
Boolean Conditioning: the CF definitions of the functions Fand 
and For are as follows: 
5.2. An Ad-Hoc Bayesian Calculus 
The ad-hoc Bayesian (AHB) calculus described below operates on 
causal rules of the form <h -> e Bel>. Recalling section 3, the 
degree of belief Be1 associated with the rule h->e is assumed to 
be a three-place list Bel=[xlfx2,x3] with xl=P(h), x2=P(elh), and 
x3=P (e 1 h) . 
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Seuuential ~ro6aaation: The literature contains several 
heuristic procedures for sequential belief update, e.g. Jeffries 
rule of conditioning (Shafer, 1981) and PROSPECTOR'S 
interpolation function (Duda et al, 1977). For the sake of 
brevity, we choose to describe here a simple interpolation 
function, discussed by Wise (1986). This function defines the 
"attenuatedw degree of belief P1(elh) as a weighted average of 
P(e(h) and P(glh), weighted by P(e) and P(g), respectively: 
The AHB sequential propagation function is implemented as a 
3-place Prolog predicate called ahb-s. The first two "inputw 
variables of ahb-s are the rule's degree of belief 
[P(h),P(elh),P(elh)] and the belief in the rule's premise P(e). 
The third woutputN variable is the attenuated, 3-place degree of 
belief, [P(h) ,PI (el h) ,PI (e 1 h) 1, which is computed through (23) . 
Note that ahbs leaves the prior P(h) intact. The variables 
naming in ahb-s is as follows: the list [P(h),P(elh),P(elh)] and 
the scalars P(h), P(e), P8(elh), and P(elh) are denoted by 
[PO,Ql,Q2], PO, Bel-e, P1, and P2, respectively. 
ahb - s([POfQ1,Q2],Bel-el [POfP1,P2]) :- 
P1 is Ql*Bel-e + (1-Q1) * (1-Bel-e) , 
P2 is Q2*Bel-e + (1-Q2) * (1-Bel-e) . 
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Parallel combination: Let <h -> el Bell> ,..., <h -> en Beln> be 
n causal rules with Beli=[P(h),P(eilh),P(eilh)l. The posterior 
belief in h in light of the evidence {el, ..., en) is computed 
through the following version of (the commutative and 
associative) Bayes rule: 
P(elIh) P(enlh) 
product-odds = ------- * . m e  * ------- 
P(ellh) P(enlh) 
P (h) 
odds = product-odds * ---- 
p (h) 
P (h 1 el, . . . , en) = odds / (l+odds) 
Let the the set {Bell, ..., Bel,) and the scalars P(h) and 
P(hlel, ..., en) be the list Bels and the atoms Prior and P, 
respectively. Given this naming convention, the Prolog 
implementation of (24) is the predicate ahbg, defined as 
follows: 
a h b j  ( [Prior 1-1 , Bels , P) : - 
mult(Bels,Product Odds), 
Odds is (prior/ (1-prior) ) * Product - Odds, 
P is Odds/ (1+0dds) . 
mult([l,l). 
mult([[Xl,X2]1Xs],Product) :- mult(Xs,Bel-Xs), 
Product is (Xl/X2) *Be1 - Xs. 
A more efficient, tail-recursive version of MULT can be defined 
as follows: 
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Boolean Conditioninq: the definitions of the functions Fand and 
For in the ad-hoc Bayesian model are equivalent to their CF 
versions : 
6. Cookins Instructions 
Wirth's (1976) design principle of <programs = algorithms + data 
structures> is well known. In the context of expert systems, 
this translates into <expert system = inference mechanism + 
knowledge-base>. In this paper we have taken the modularity 
principle one step further, achieving what may be described 
symbolically as <inference mechanism = inference engine + belief 
calculus>. The resulting SOLVE environment is basically a 
collection of modules that can be intermixed without having to 
tinker with the theory of any one individual module. 
The practice of incremental enhancements of meta-interpreters was 
analyzed by Sterling (1986). This analysis, which draws its 
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terminology from-object programming, suggests that Prolog meta- 
interpreters are analogous to Lisp Flavors. Using Sterling's 
language (which is underlined), the modules PARSE and 
<Fs,Fp,Fand,For> are orthoaonal enhancements to the SOLVE flavor, 
in that the computations necessary for incorporating them are 
completely separate. The PARSE predicate amounts to a behavioral 
enhancement: it extends the computation performed by SOLVE 
without changing the meta-goal of the enhanced meta-interpreter. 
This is done simply by adding the parsing predicates to SOLVE'S 
theory. The flavor SOLVE(H,Bel,Fs,Fp,Fand,For) is a structural 
enhancement of the vannila flavor SOLVE(H), in that the extra 
arguments <Fs,Fp,Fand,For> (which are winitializedn to a specific 
belief calculus <fs,fp,fand,for>) are used to compute Be1 as H is 
being solved. 
So, now that all the ingredients have been provided, the creation 
of a rule-based inference system is merely a matter of mixing 
flavors. Let p and q be two Prolog predicates whose extended 
theory is stored in two files named "pH and @*q" (the extended 
theory of p includes p t s  theory and the theory of all the 
predicates mentioned in p t s  theory). In what follows, when we 
say Itadd p to qtl or "mix p and qw we mean "prove the goals 
consult (p) and consult (q) . 
With that in mind, to prepare a CF-oriented inference system, 
follow this set of instructions: 
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1. Create a CF-oriented knowledge-base and save 
it in a file called KBASE 
2 .  Prove the goal define-syntax 
3 .  Mix the cf parse predicate with the SOLVE flavor 
4. Add the predicates cf-s, cfj, cf-and, cf-or 
5. Mix the resulting inference system with the 
knowledge-base KBASE 
6. Confirm the hypothesis h and compute its posterior 
certainty-factor by proving the meta-theorem 
solve(h,Bel,cf~s,cfjIcfIand~cffor)~ 
To prepare a Bayesian-oriented inference system, follow this set 
of instructions: 
1. Create a Bayesian-oriented knowledge-base and save 
it in a file called KBASE 
2. Prove the goal define-syntax 
3. Mix the ahb parse predicate with the SOLVE flavor 
4. Add the predicates ahb-st ahbj, ahb - and, ahb-or 
5. Mix the resulting inference system with the 
knowledge-base KBASE 
6. Confirm the hypothesis h and compute its posterior 
(ad-hoc) Bayesian belief by proving the meta-theorem 
solve(h,Bellahb-sIahbjIahbhbandtahb-or). 
As far as Prolog is concerned, the fully instantiated SOLVE meta- 
interpreter is yet another predicate. Therefore, one can blend 
SOLVE with standard Prolog in order to implement the typical bits 
and pieces which make up full-blown expert systems. For example, 
let's go back to our dubious dating system. Perhaps the most 
useful output of this application would be a reorganized version 
of the little black book, sorted in decreasing order of composite 
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attractiveness.' This book may be prepared by the following (CF- 
oriented) predicate: 
create (Book) : - bagof ( (XI Rating) , 
(potential-date (X) , 
s o 1 v e ( d a t e ( X ) , R a t i n g , c f ~ s I c f ~ r ) ) ,  
Xs) 1 
sort (Xs , Book) . 
Given the database described in section 3 (consisting of only two 
potential dates), the goal create(Book) will yield the response: 
Book = [(pat10.832),(nicky,0.426)]. 
The casual nature of the dating example should not be confused 
with the underlying seriousness of the SOLVE meta-interpreter. 
Consider, for example, a medical diagnosis application. In this 
context, potential dates and their perceived characteristics 
correspond to prospective diseases and symptom manifestations, 
respectively. Sub-hypotheses, like wrich(X),N correspond to 
clinical syndromes or intermediate diagnoses. Finally, dating 
rules are analogous to text-book medical knowledge and heuristic 
inferences of experienced experts. Under this interpretation, 
the evaluation of a propspective date is analogous to the 
diagnosis of a certain patient. In this context, the goal 
create(Book) should probably be renamed to rank(Diseases). Given 
a certain knowledge-base and a set of symptoms (stored in KBASE), 
this goal gives a list of all the potential diseases that this 
patient might have, in decreasing order of likelihood. 
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7. Conclusions and Future Research 
The validity of alternative belief languages can be investigated 
in two different and complementary methodologies. The analytic 
approach is chiefly concerned with comparing belief calculi to 
well-known normative criteria, e,g. probability theory or 
predicate logic. This line of research leads quite clearly to 
the realization that, not unlike the humans that they attempt to 
model, all rule-based belief calculi contain varying degrees of 
normative violations. Nonetheless, the extent of these 
violations is not well understood, and the sensitivity of the 
system's advice to such violations is still an open question. 
In spite of their normative deficiencies, rule-based belief 
calculi are widely-used in commercial expert systems. Moreover, 
it might be that a careful design of the underlying knowledge- 
base might ensure that normative violations are kept to a 
minimum. with that in mind, there is a crucial need for an 
em~irical methodology for investigating the external validity of 
alternative belief calculi. This line of research will simulate 
experimental settings in which the expertise of human subjects is 
elicited and represented via different belief languages. The 
experiments will then pit the systems' recommendations with (a) 
the judgment of the humans that they claim to model, and, (b) an 
external norm, such as the 'Itrue state of the world.11 
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There exist very-few empirical studies related to expert systems, 
and the com~arative study of alternative belief languages is no 
exception. Most of the work in this area was carried out during 
the last two years, e.g. Mitchell (1986), Yadrick et a1 (1986), 
Wise (1986), and Schocken (1987). These studies attempt to 
understand the conditions under which one belief language 
performs better than another. Therefore, they have important 
prescriptive implications on knowledge engineering. 
One limitation that inhibited more research in this direction has 
been a lack of a common benchmark environment. Such environment 
ought to simulate rule-based inference on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, allow a great deal of design flexibility in terms 
of experimenting with alternative belief calculi. We feel that 
the SOLVE meta-interpreter presented in this paper is a first 
step toward closing this gap. We hope that other people will 
modify this meta-interpreter to meet their own research needs, 
and that this will promote further understanding of the empirical 
validity of expert systems. 
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/* The following is a listing of all the miscellaneous 
predicates referred to in the paper */ 
apply(Predicate,Args) :- Predicate=..PredList, 
append(PredList,Args,GoalList), 
goal=..GoalList, 
call (Goal) . 
bagof(X,G,-) :- asserta(found(mark)),G,asserta(found(X)),fai1. 
bagof (-,-, L) : - collectFound([] ,M) , ! I W M .  
collectFound(Lin,Lout):- getNext(X),!,collectFound([X/Lin]tLout). 
collectFound(Lin,Lin). 
getNext (X) : - retract (found (X) ) , ! I not (X==mark) . 
abs(X,Z) :- X<O, Z is -(X). 
abs (X, X) : - X>=O. 
/*  the following predicate sorts a list of pairs [X,Y] in 
decreasing order of Y */ 
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